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The  geography  of  scientific  knowledge  is  defined  as  the  replication  process  of  locally 
produced  knowledge  claims.  Proximity  in  social,  cognitive,  and  physical  dimensions 
promotes the sharing of tacit knowledge. Thus, given the complementarity between tacit and 
codified  knowledge,  proximity  supports  the  replication  of  codified  knowledge  claims. 
Distinguishing between controversial and uncontroversial contexts, one can understand the 
sociology of science as explaining the behaviour of scientists from their proximity to other 
scientists, and the sociology of scientific knowledge as describing the processes that constitute 
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With  the  rise  of  sociology  of  scientific  knowledge  in  the  1970s,  sociologists  started  the 
positive  study  of  scientific  knowledge  production.  It  marked  a  break  with  philosophy  of 
science  that  took  a  normative  perspective  on  science.  Rather  than  posing  the  traditional 
philosophical  question  under  what  conditions  empirical  knowledge  can  be  said  to  be 
scientifically true, sociologists started to analyse the conditions under which a knowledge 
claim  becomes  accepted  among  scientists  as  being  scientific  (Gilbert  1976;  Shapin  1984; 
Collins 1985). The rise of sociology of scientific knowledge also marked a break with the 
classical  sociology  of  science  programme  (Merton  1973),  which  looks  at  the  institutions 
governing  scientific  activity  rather  than  the  conditions  under  which  a  knowledge  claim 
becomes accepted within science.  
 
Recently, some sociologists of scientific knowledge have paid more explicit attention to the 
geography of scientific knowledge production. Following the distinction between space and 
place (Castells 1996), scientists’ activities can  be described  in terms of the physical sites 
where people produce knowledge claims (‘space of places’), and in terms of communication 
networks of exchange through which knowledge claim circulate (‘space of flows’). It will be 
argued  that  a  perspective  solely  focusing  on  place  specifities  in  scientific  knowlegde 
production  is  not  fully  consistent  with  sociology  of  scientific  knowledge,  since  a  place 
perspective does not address the central question how knowledge claims become accepted 
elsewhere (Shapin 1998). To say a new knowledge claim originates from a specific ‘place’ is   4 
to play down the importance of past claims on which a claim builds and, equivalently, the 
importance of future claims that will build on a claim. A knowledge claim always originates 
from empirical observations in a particular place and it becomes accepted as scientific only by 
‘travelling’  to  other  places  through  texts,  instruments  and  people.  The  central  research 
question for a geography of scientific knowledge holds under what conditions a knowledge 
claim  originating  from  one  place  becomes  accepted  as  scientific  in  other  places  (Shapin 
1998).  
 
Analogous  to  the  distinction  between  sociology  of  scientific  knowledge  and  the  classic 
sociology of science, it is proposed here to use the term geography of scientific knowledge for 
the  study  of  how  knowledge  claims  become  replicated  across  different  places,  while 
geography of science (or geographies of science) as used elsewhere can be reserved to cover 
the  larget set of questions regarding the  local shaping and  spatial diffusion of scienti tific 
practices  (Barnes  2001;  Livingstone  2003;  Naylor  2005;  Powell  2007).  Thus,  whereas 
geography of scientific knowledge – by sociology of scientific knowledge – concerns the 
process rendering claims scientific, geography of science looks at science in all its facets yet 
without specific interest in the epistemological question. Note here that the same distinction 
between science and scientific knowledge has been made regarding the economics of science 
and the economics of scientific knowledge (Hands 1994). 
 
Thus stated, the central question in the geography of scientific knowledge is a reformulation 
of the question posed by sociologists of scientific knowledge. This allows one to shed a new 
light on scientific knowledge production by bringing in concepts and methodologies from 
geography. In particular, we will make use of the concept of proximity to disentangle the 
various  types  of  relationships  between  scientists  –  cognitive,  social,  and  physical  –  that   5 
support the acceptance of knowledge claims. We aim to make three contributions. First, we 
want  to  outline  the  contours  of  a  geography  of  scientific  knowledge  by  formulating  its 
research  question  as  a  question  regarding  the  conditions  under  which  a  knowledge  claim 
originating  from  one  place  becomes  accepted  as  scientific  in  other  places.  This  research 
question follows from the distinction between knowledge as know-how and knowledge as a 
claim. Second, we put forward a candidate explanation based on the proximity concept. Our 
explanation  will  emphasise  the  role  of  physical proximity without privileging it over other 
forms  of  proximity  that  regulate  the  replication  process  of  knowledge  claims.  Third,  by 
distinguishing between controversial and uncontroversial contexts, we aim to synthesize the 
main tenets of sociology of science and the sociology of scientific knowledge into a unified 
proximity framework. Where the sociology of science explains the behaviour of scientists 
from their proximity to other scientists, the sociology of scientific knowledge describes the 
processes  that  constitute  the  proximity  between  scientists.  That  is,  where  in  the  former 
proximity relations are treated as exogenous, in the latter it is treated as endogenous. 
 
In order to put forward a framework for geography of scientific knowledge, the scope of the 
the  present  paper  is  deliberately  limited.  The  argumentation  that  follows  is  confined  to 
experimental  laboratory  science  and  we  do  not  claim  to  cover  all  forms  of  scientific 
knowledge  production.  Some  of  the  arguments  that  are  being  made  in  the  context  of 
laboratories  and  experimental  science  may  not carry  over  to  knowledge  production  using 
other research methods. Obviously, a future geography of scientific knowledge should also 
cover scientific knowledge production of a non-experimental kind. The focus on how claims 
are  being  replicate  among  scientists  constitutes  a  second  major  limitation.  We  are  not 
concerned here in how knowledge claims become replicated by society at large nor in  how 
local social contexts affect the particular content of knowledge claims or the practices of   6 
replicating  these  claims  (cf.  Barnes  2001;  Whatmore  2009).  Thus,  our  framework  is  not 
intended to be used for  the  specific issues concerning the  ‘science-society interface’ even 
though  a  fully-fledged  geography  of  scientific  knowledge  would  have  to  include  these 
questions as well. Rather, we start here by outlining a proximity framework that can be used 
to study the replication of knowledge claims among scientists who are distribitued in physical, 
cognitive and social spaces.  
 
We will proceed by focussing our discussion on the problem of replication of experimental 
results in science (section II). It is then argued that the replication process of experimental 
knowledge  through  replication  is  only  partially  constitutive  of  the  replication  process  of 
knowledge claims as knowledge claims can be replicated without the underlying experiment 
being replicated (section III). We then turn to the role of proximity (in social, cognitive, and 
physical  dimensions)  in  the  replication  of  knowledge  claims  (section  IV)  and  how  such 
proximities are constituted (section V). Concluding remarks follow (section VI). 
 
 
II. On replication in science 
 
The  central  question  in  the  sociology  of  scientific  knowledge  concerns  the  question  how 
knowledge  claims  become  established  as  scientific  in  society.  Different  from  traditional 
philosophy of science, which treated this question from a normative point of view (when 
should a claim considered to be true?), sociologists turned to the empirical study of scientific 
knowledge production and asked the question from a positive point of view (when do people 
consider  a  claim  to  be  scientific?).  Since  scientists’  knowledge  production  is  by  nature   7 
geographically  localised  in  laboratories,  the  question  of  how  knowledge  claims  become 
established as scientific in various places is an immediate spatial one. 
 
In the early stages of what is generally associated with modern experimental science, fellow 
scientists were indeed often invited to eyewitness an experiment (Shapin 1994). Co-presence 
of individuals was of importance to multiply witnesses and, hereby, to establish a consensus 
about  what  exactly  is  being  observed  and  how  these  observations  are  to  be  interpreted. 
Progressively, co-presence became less common, though co-presence still plays a role in team 
research. Witnessing, instead, has become organised through codification in written reports 
that are evaluated by peer-review before publication and by reading after publication. The rise 
of modern science is then to be understood as a new mode of knowledge production in which 
empirical knowledge is communicated in codified form such that fellow scientists can engage 
in ‘virtual witnessing’ (Shapin 1984, p. 491). In this manner, witnesses are ‘multiplied’ and a 
claim  –  if  judged  credible  –  becomes  established  as  scientific.  Without  codification  of  a 
knowledge claim  in a written report, the credibility of a knowledge claim would  have to 
depend  solely on the testimonies of those who have  witnessed the experiment. In such  a 
system, the production of knowledge claims would be severely constrained by space and time 
due to the need of physical co-presence. That is, the division of labour among scientists has 
become possible only through the codification of experimental results in written format by 
replacing eye witnessing by virtual witnessing. 
 
To develop a geography of scientific knowledge, one can start from the idea that knowledge 
becomes scientific once a report on specific experimental events is accepted as credible by 
others not co-present at the site of observation. To establish credibility, a written report should 
not  only  describe  the  actual  event,  but  also  the  laboratory  conditions
i  (objects,  physical   8 
conditions, equipment, protocols, methodologies, etc.) under which the event is generated, as 
to allow fellow scientists to attempt to replicate the experiment at different sites. Subsequent 
replications of an experiment by fellow scientists, if successful, lead to the accumulation of 
confirmations  of  the  original  claim.  It  is  common  to  view  the  process  of  successful 
replications of experiments at different sites as evidence that the original knowledge claim is 
universally true. Accordingly, scientific knowledge is commonly considered as ‘placeless’ 
(Livingstone  2003)  in  the  sense  that  claims  that  have  been  proven  replicable  in  different 
places hold independently from the observations of scientists who have been involved in the 
process of successive replications. Even though laboratories have the capability to replicate 
findings with a  high degree of precision, and hereby are able to ‘construct predictability’ 
(Nightingale  2004),  this  does  not  change  the  fact  that  a  knowledge  claim  can  become 
established  as  scientific  without  any  other  researcher  ever  attempting  to  replicate  the 
experiment underlying the knowledge claim. Fellow scientists may accept an unconfirmed 
knowledge claim in the case that they trust that the experiment was carried out correctly as 
written down in a report. Trust depends implicitly on the belief that if the experiment would 
be replicated, it would be confirmed. This belief is in essence no different than the belief that 
an  experiment  that  has  been  confirmed  in  the  past,  will  again  be  confirmed  in  future 
replications – better known as the problem of induction. 
 
Following  this  reasoning,  Shapin  (1984)  argued  that  the  establishment  of  an  empirical 
knowledge claim as scientific is fundamentally driven by the perceived replicability of the 
experiment,  and  not  necessarily  by  actual  replications  of  the  experiment,  that  is,  the 
replication  of  the  know-how  required  to  replicate  the  experiment.  The  codification  of 
experimental results in a report can thus be considered as a rhetoric act to convince the reader 
that the  experiment  described  can  be  replicated  in  different  places  and  at  different  times   9 
provided that the laboratory conditions as described in the report are replicated as well. The 
disclosure of the laboratory conditions is essential to suggest that the report is trustworthy in 
case any scientist would decide to attempt to replicate the experiment. It is for this reason that 
the description of laboratory conditions in itself may be sufficient for a knowledge claim to 
become established as scientific, that is, as credible. 
 
The distinction between know-how and knowledge claim extends to the distinction between 
the replication of know-how and the replication of a knowledge claim. In the instance of 
replication of know-how, the actual replication process of an experiment at a different site 
leads to the replication of know-how developed elsewhere. In the case of the replication of a 
knowledge claim, some of the implications of the experiment are replicated as an input to 
design a new research project, without the experiment itself being replicated necessarily. The 
replication of a knowledge claim occurs when it is used as an input in the production of new 
knowledge claims. Production and replication are thus intimately interrelated (Callon 2002). 
In  evolutionary  terms,  knowledge  claims  are  replicated  in  new  knowledge  claims  by 
recombination.
ii Through the replication of knowledge claims, particular claims are  being 
gradually selected and hereby become accepted. 
 
The large majority of replication processes in science can be characterised by replication of 
knowledge claims rather than of replication of the know-how required to replicate an actual 
experiment.  Previous  knowledge  claims  guide  the  production  of  future  knowledge  claims 
through  their  use  in  assumptions,  methodologies,  instruments  or  interpretations.  Research 
projects build on previous research by extending it to new domains and improving its levels of 
precision, not by attempting to perfectly replicate past experiments. In doing so, previous 
claims are invoked, and thus replicated, to support a new claim. Even if a knowledge claim is   10 
questioned by the production of a new claim, the claim is still being replicated in that it is 
regarded as relevant in the scientific discourse. Only by remaining silent about the knowledge 




III. Tacit knowledge 
 
The  distinction  between  know-how and knowledge claim relates to the distinction between 
tacit and codified knowledge. The set of  instructions as codified  in a scientific paper are 
generally insufficient for fellow scientists to be able to replicate an experiment. The codified 
instructions have to be complemented with the relevant tacit knowledge that is required for 
scientists to fully understand a knowledge claim and to be able to replicate the underlying 
experiment (Collins 1985; Balconi et al. 2007). As we defined know-how as the knowledge 
that is produced when a scientist, or group of scientists, carries out an experiment, know-how 
thus consists of both codified and tacit elements. 
 
The  definition  of  tacit  knowledge  used  here  is  taken  from  Collins,  who  defined  tacit 
knowledge as: 
 
“knowledge  or  abilities  that  can  be  passed  between  scientists  by  personal 
contact but cannot be, or have not been, set out or passed on in formulae, 
diagrams, or verbal descriptions and instructions for action.” (Collins 2001, p. 
72) 
   11 
The definition of tacit knowledge  by Collins (2001) does not imply that tacit knowledge 
cannot be codified. Indeed, an important part of scientists’ activities involves the codification 
of  tacit  knowledge  such  that  it  can  be  transmitted  verbally  or  textually.  However,  the 
possibility of codification of tacit knowledge in turn does not imply that codified information 
can  be  exchanged  unambiguously  as  the  receiver  of  codified  information  still  requires 
complementary tacit knowledge as ‘interpretative skills’ to interpret the information content 
as meaningful in a particular material context (Balconi et al. 2007, p. 836 and p. 842; cf. 
Nelson 2003, p. 911). In this view, codified information only becomes codified knowledge if 
the receiver has the complementary  interpretative skills that are required to transform the 
codified information into a meaningful interpretation. 
 
With the production of a new knowledge claim resulting from a new experiment, new tacit  
knowledge is produced as well resulting from the experiment. The subsequent publication of 
the new knowledge claim requires the readers to possess the new tacit knowledge as well, if 
they are to successfully replicate the experiment underlying the knowledge claim. Since the 
production  of  new  knowledge  claims  is  accompanied  by  the  production  of  new  tacit 
knowledge, the problem of replication of experiments lies in the problem of transfer of tacit 
knowledge.  If  indeed  the  replication  of  experiments  involves  both  tacit  and  codified 
knowledge,  and  the  tacit  elements  of  knowledge  cannot  be  transferred  perfectly  among 
scientists, scientists can never be fully ascertain that they replicate an experiment perfectly. 
T h a t   i s   t o   s a y ,   i f   a   l a b o r atory replicates an experiment and comes up with (slightly) different 
results, the scientists involved cannot ascertain whether the divergence in results means that 
the original claim has to be rejected or whether the replication experiment has been carried 
out in the wrong way, that is, in a different way than what has been reported in the original 
claim.   12 
 
The  fundamental  problem  in  replication  experiments  lies  in  what  Collins  called 
‘experimenters’ regress’, which: 
 
“arises  because  the  skill-like  nature  of  experimentation  means  that  the 
competence of experimenters and the  integrity of  experiments can only  be 
ascertained  by  examining  results,  but  the  appropriate  results  can  only  be 
known from competently performed experiments, and so forth. Other ways of 
testing for the competence and integrity of experiments, such as tests of tests, 
turn out to need ‘tests of tests of tests’ and so on.” (Collins 1985, p. 130). 
  
In  short,  good  equipment  produced  correct  measurements,  but  what  counts  as  a  correct 
measurement  is  whatever  good  equipment  produces.  To  establish  whether  equipment  is 
properly working, one can carry out an experiment with a ‘known’ outcome, but this outcome 
has become established in other experiments using the equipment at hand. Alternatively, one 
may test the working of equipment using test equipment, but this moves the problem one level 
up (“tests of tests of tests”). The implication of the experimental regress thesis holds that the 
truth status of a knowledge claim cannot be decided on the basis of experimental evidence 
alone, but also involves a process of consensus building among the scientists involved. 
 
Geographically, knowledge claims stem from research carried out in specific local contexts, 
yet for the knowledge to become established as scientific is has to become perceived as being 
‘placeless’. The global network of scientists and their laboratories constitutes a ‘transportation 
infrastructure’  to  replicate  empirical  findings  from  one  place  to  another.
  In  this  context, 
Nightingale (2004) speaks of social and physical infrastructures that need to be in place to   13 
construct  predictability.  If  replications  could  be  perfect,  the  geography  of  scientific 
knowledge  would  be  trivial  (of  course  scientific  knowledge  is  being  produced  in  certain 
places) and at the same time irrelevant (for knowledge to become scientific is precisely to 
become placeless through replication). Such a conclusion can only be drawn if one would 
hold on to idea that experimental findings can be perfectly replicated, and hence, be attributed 
a truth status that in independent from place and time. 
 
Since experimental findings cannot be replicated with full certainty, and many findings are 
never  replicated  in  the  first  place,  the  geography  of  scientific  knowledge  should  not  be 
equated with the replication process of experiments. Rather, scientific practice involves the 
replication of knowledge claims. Science as a process can thus be considered to be first and 
foremost as a replication process of knowledge claims. As to become accepted as scientific, a 
knowledge  claim  has  to  diffuse  between  physical  sites,  but  for  this  to  happen  the  tacit 
knowledge that was  involved  in the experiment reported, need  not be replicated between 
physical sites. The central research question for a geography of scientific knowledge thus 
becomes:  what  determines  that  a  knowledge  claim  is  replicated  in  different  places  as  to 





The  problem  of  experimental  regress  implies  that one  cannot  explain  the  credibility  of  a 
knowledge claim from the empirical evidence supporting the claim alone. Since empirical 
evidence can only be invoked as a partial explanation of the credibility of a knowledge claim, 
the unit of analysis in geography of scientific knowledge can be taken to be the interaction   14 
between  scientists  who  mutually  judge  the  credibility  of  their  knowledge  claims.  More 
precisely, following Shapin (1995, p. 261), any explanation of the credibility of a knowledge 
claim has to specify the relationship between the one(s) putting forward the claim (who we 
will call here ‘claimant’), and the one judging its credibility (who is called here ‘evaluator’). 
 
Since  the  replication  of  a  knowledge  claim  takes  the  form  of  an  input  in  a  subsequent 
knowledge claim, credibility emerges from the re-use of previous knowledge claims. Re-use 
here  means  that  a  claim  is  used  to  think  about  new  research  questions,  to  design  new 
experiments, to interpret its outcomes, and to codify results in written form (Dasgupta and 
David 1994, p. 500). Since knowledge claims are replicated in subsequent knowledge claims 
in  these  manners,  the  chance  of  a  claim  being  replicated  will  depend  not  only  on  its 
credibility, but also on its usefulness in guiding new research projects. Thus, for a claim to be 
replicated as an input in a subsequent empirical research context, evaluators should consider 
the claim to be both credible and useful.
iv The question becomes how an evaluator established 
the credibility and usefulness of a claimant’s knowledge claim.
v 
 
We answer this  question  by  focussing  on  the  relationship  between  the  claimant  and  the 
evaluator. This micro-perspective may be questioned since, in many cases, the evaluator will 
not judge the claimant’s credibility of a knowledge claim directly, but rather will base his/her 
judgement  on  the  overall  scientific  reputation  of  the  claimant  built  up  through  past 
performance. Generally, highly reputed scientists see their claims being replicated much more 
widely than non-reputed scientists. However, the reputation that scientists built up in the past 
is based on previous knowledge claims that have become accepted widely throughout their 
community. Thus, even though reputation plays probably an important role in the assessment 
of  the  credibility  of  a  knowledge  claim,  this  reputation  has  been  the  outcome  of  past   15 
replication  processes  of  knowledge  claims.  The  question  remains  how  an  evaluator 
established the credibility and usefulness of a claimant’s knowledge claim. 
 
To characterise the relationship between claimant and evaluator, we will make use of the 
notion of proximity as developed in economic geography (Rallet 1993; Rallet and Torre 1999; 
Boschma 2005; Torre 2008).
vi Proximity simply denotes the inverse of the distance between 
two  scientists.  Proximity  can  refer  to  physical  proximity  in  the  literal  sense  of  physical 
distance  separating  two  scientists  (which  Rallet  and  Torre  tend  to  call  geographical 
proximity), or it can refer to other forms of proximity. The thesis that is developed in detail 
below  holds  that  the  more  distant claimant and evaluator are in physical and non-physical 
spaces, the less probable the claimant’s knowledge claim is being replicated by the evaluator. 
 
To be able to judge a claim, cognitive proximity (Cohendet and Llerena 1997; Nooteboom 
1999) seems to be by far the most important factor. Cognitive proximity in a narrow sense can 
be defined as the extent to which two scientists share the code of communication that is used 
in  a  particular  disciplinary  context.  Following  this  narrow  definition,  cognitive  proximity 
allows an evaluator to de-code the written report containing the knowledge claim as to assess 
its credibility and usefulness. Cognitive proximity, in the sense just defined, is consistent with 
the idea that knowledge can be transmitted as information as long as sender and receiver use 
to  the  same  code  to  code  and  decode  the  message  (Cowan  et  al.  2000).  The  idea  that 
knowledge can be exchanged as codified information provided that two agents share the same 
codebook has been criticized on several grounds (Nelson 2003; Nightingale 2003; Balconi et 
al. 2007). A codebook can be seen as a language that has to be shared between agents to allow 
for verbal and written communication. However, since languages cannot be fully formalised, 
the  meaning  of  symbols  referring  to  empirical  objects  remains  to  some  extent  tacit.  A   16 
language cannot be taught but must be learned in practice by participating in material contexts 
in which a language is used in a specific way. In this context, Balconi et al. (2007, pp. 840-
843)  distinguish  between  tacit  knowledge  of  the  physical  (‘skill-like’)  type  and  of  the 
cognitive type. The latter type is often overlooked, but may be more important to understand 
the replication process of knowledge claims. Tacit knowledge of the physical type can usually 
be codified relatively easily while the tacit knowledge of the cognitive type cannot. What is 
more, in the codification process of tacit knowledge of the physical type (e.g., into computer 
algorithms),  new  tacit  knowledge  of  the  cognitive  type  is  being  created  concerning  the 
appropriate use of codified information in particular research contexts. 
 
Generally, the evaluator cannot fully judge the credibility and the usefulness of a claim from a 
text alone. As text length is limited, many details will be left out. What is more, the tacit 
knowledge involved in the experiment is not transmitted with the text. Thus, an evaluator 
would  benefit  from  having  similar  tacit  knowledge  as  was  involved  in  carrying  out  the 
experiment. These ‘intellectual skills’ (Balconi et al. 2007, p. 842) allows an evaluator to 
‘read  between  the  lines’  and  to  better  understand  how  the  experiment  what  carried  out, 
whether  the  observational  reports  are  trustworthy,  and  how  likely  the  experiment  can  be 
replicated with a high degree of precision. Thus, cognitive proximity in a broader sense can be 
taken to mean the extent to which claimant and evaluator share codified and tacit knowledge 
regarding the experimental context in question. It is cognitive proximity that allows scientists 
to  judge  a  knowledge  claim  without  any  face-to-face  interaction  between  claimant  and 
evaluator; cognitive proximity is what makes Shapin’s ‘virtual witnessing’ possible. From 
reading a text, a ‘competent’ evaluator can judge its credibility and usefulness.
vii Obviously, 
few people are cognitively close; typically, high levels of cognitive proximity will only be 
found in small communities that make up highly specialised sub-disciplines that reproduce   17 
themselves by training their own successors. This explains why most claims in science are 
assessed on credibility and usefulness only within these small communities and without any 
interference  from  actors  outside  these  communities.  Actors  outside  these  communities 
including  fellow  scientists  and  (a  large  part  of)  the  public,  derive  the  credibility  and 
usefulness of claims indirectly from the peer assessment carried out within these small sub-
communities (Shapin 1995, pp. 269-271). 
 
As argued, the assessment of a claim in terms of credibility and usefulness is often carried out 
without  any  interaction  between  claimant  and  evaluator.  As  along  as  the  claimant  and 
evaluator have a sufficient amount of codified and tacit knowledge in common, claims can be 
assessed at a distance. Yet, the subsequent replication of a knowledge claim as an input in 
new experiments typically necessitates, or at least benefits from face-to-face interaction as to 
transfer tacit knowledge, instruments, materials, further information and so on. It is for this 
reason  that  some  form  of  interaction  between  claimant  and  evaluator  often  precedes  the 
replication  of  a  knowledge  claim  in  a  subsequent  claim.  This  can  vary  from  personal 
correspondence  or  small  talk  to  more  intensive  forms  of  interaction  including  site  visits, 
temporary  exchange  of  personnel  and  collaborative  research  projects.  All  these  forms  of 
interaction  are  examples  of  close  interaction  rendering  these  interactions  fundamentally 
different from written communication or oral presentation involving a one-to-many form of 
interaction.  In  many  cases,  such  meetings  also  entail  the  demonstration  of  (part  of) 
experiments so as to explain better how certain results were reached (Collins 1985).
viii Thus, 
the  replication  of  experiments,  or  parts  of  experiments,  is  not  necessarily  being  done  to 
confirm or disconfirm a claim, but can also be done for the sole purpose to learn how to carry 
out an experiment in order to exploit the newly acquired tacit knowledge in new experiments 
to come.
ix   18 
 
The immediate question that arises from this concerning the replication of knowledge claims 
is under what conditions scientists are willing to share tacit knowledge, information and other 
resources.
x  Though  scientists’  main  incentive  is  to  see  their  knowledge  claims  being 
replicated  (Hull  1988),  their  have  less  incentive  to  see  resources  being  replicated,  since 
sharing resources allows other laboratories to pursue the same research lines and to pre-empt 
future publications. Since reward in science is allocated on the basis of priority in research 
findings (whatever the exact ways in which priority is established), the incentive to share 
resources is limited.
xi What is more, sharing resources is is a costly affair, especially for what 
concerns tacit knowledge that requires teaching and on-the-job training, while compensation 
schemes for sharing activities are rare. It is in this context that Callon (1994) and Dasgupta 
and David (1994), though from different perspectives, both criticized the idea of science as a 
public  good  as  a  non-rival  and  non-excludable  good.  What  characterises  a  scientific 
knowledge claim is that despite their codified form, the complementary tacit knowledge is 
rival (because it is embodied in persons) and can be excluded from others (because it cannot 
be learnt from reading texts alone). 
 
For  an  important part, the willingness to share resources is internalised as a norm through 
socialisation known as the Mertonian norm of communalism (Merton 1973). Not only does 
this norm promote cooperative behaviour as such, but also the confidence that the knowledge 
that is being disclosed is precise and made relevant to the interests in the contexts of the 
research project of the receiver. However, as mentioned before, the importance of priority will 
lead scientists to circumvent the norm of communalism through various tactics, in particular, 
by partial or delayed transfer of tacit knowledge and other resources.
xii Dasgupta and David 
concluded that despite the culture of communalism in science,    19 
 
“wastage must be viewed as a regrettable necessity only if the reward system 
(…)  cannot  sufficiently  compensate  scientists  to  induce  them  to  develop 
research  tools  that  would  be  useable  (by  anyone)  in  subsequent  inquires.” 
(Dasgupta and David 1994, p. 502) 
 
Apart from the norm of communalism, an important incentive to share resources is the risk of 
reputational  loss.  Within  the  sub-communities  in  which  scientists  are  operating,  those 
unwilling to share tacit knowledge will run the risk that third parties will no longer share 
resources with them once they are notified (Dasgputa and David 1994, p. 504). In this respect, 
the concept of social proximity can be used to explain the willingness of scientist A to share 
resources to scientist B. Social proximity here refers to the number of fellow scientists A and 
B know in common. The higher this number, the higher the reputational consequences once 
the word gets out that A does not behave cooperatively, given that B will warn those that A 
and B know in common about A’s non-cooperative behaviour. Thus, the higher the social 
proximity between claimant and evaluator, the higher the willingness of the claimant to share 
tacit  knowledge  and  other  resources  with  the  evaluator,  the  higher  the  probability  the 
evaluator will replicate the claim in subsequent claims. As for cognitive proximity, social 
proximity is typically high in small sub-communities in which the members frequently meet, 
carry  out  peer-review  and  engage  in  collaborative  research  projects.
xiii  And,  given  the 
specialised  nature of scientific knowledge production, cognitive and  social proximity will 
tend to be highly correlated (cf. Breschi and Lissoni 2009). 
 
The importance of cognitive and social proximity to the replication of knowledge claims puts 
the role of geography into perspective. With physical proximity we mean the role played by   20 
the physical distance between scientists. For two scientists to get in contact, they have to 
spend time and resources with these costs roughly increasing with physical distance.
xiv Since 
the transfer of tacit knowledge and most other resources involves  face-to-face  interaction, 
possibly organised in multiple meetings, the role of physical distance in the probability of a 
knowledge  claim  being  replicated,  is  non-negligible.  A  second  advantage  of  face-to-face 
interaction  holds  that  it  supports  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  cognitive  and  social 
proximity. Face-to-face interaction offers the possibility of having thick and complex forms of 
interaction  in  which  not  only  language  is  involved  but  the  entire  behavioural  complex. 
Contrary to modern communication media co-presence enables the establishment of common 
reference  frames  through  rapid  feedback,  pointing  and  referring  to  objects  in  real  space, 
informal exchanges during breaks, and a shared local context (Olson and Olson 2000). These 
interactions conditions are supportive of increasing the cognitive proximity, upon which one 
can rely in future long-distance communication. And, mere exposure to others and informal 
interaction in itself affects peoples’ feelings about one another, which are supportive of social 
proximity  inducing cooperative  behaviour. Though alternative  communication  media exist 
that support cognitive and social proximity, these are far less effective (Urry 2002). 
  
The role of physical proximity in the replication of knowledge claims is in line with earlier 
critiques  on  the  popular  conceptions  of  scientific  knowledge  as  ‘a  view  from  nowhere’ 
(Shapin 1998) and scientific laboratories as ‘placeless places’ (Livingstone 2003). Science 
would only be truly placeless if the probability of a knowledge claim to be reproduced is fully 
independent  of  any  form  of  proximity.  Put  differently,  whether  someone  replicates  a 
knowledge claim should be independent from his/her distance, in physical and non-physical 
terms, to those putting forward the knowledge claim. This idea has been underlying the notion 
of science as a public good, that is, as information which use is non-rival and non-excludable   21 
to anyone is society. Since scientists replicate each other knowledge claims much easier if 
t h e y   a l s o   s h a r e   t he resources, and since proximity promotes resource sharing, the conditions 
of non-rivalry and non-excludability are best met among proximate scientists. Ironically, the 
most proximate scientists are those working together within the walls of laboratories, from 





From an economics of science perspective, the imperfect transfer of resources is explained 
from the private incentives of scientists. Imperfect here means that in contexts where there is 
no incentive to behave cooperatively, tacit knowledge will not be transferred or only partially, 
while in contexts where scientists have an incentive to behave cooperatively, tacit knowledge 
will be fully transferred (Dasgupta and David 1994). By contrast, the sociology of scientific 
knowledge starts from the premise that full sharing of resources is impossible by definition. 
Tacit knowledge can only be shared partially and in so far tacit knowledge becomes codified 
as information, new tacit knowledge is required to understand the codified information. This 
implies, as explained before, that scientists can never be sure to have replicated an experiment 
perfectly, due to the problem of ‘experimental regress’. 
 
The issue of replication is left untouched in the economics of science program as proposed by 
Dasgupta and David (1994, p. 499), who stated in the context of priority that: 
 
“among the discoveries (..) made by rivals involved in parallel research only 
the first is worthwhile to society; there  is  no social  value-added  when the   22 
same discovery is made a second, third or fourth time. [footnote 34: by this we 
do not, of course, mean independent confirmation of a scientific discovery, 
which is a different matter altogether]”. 
 
In this respect, economics of science explicitly builds upon what Dasgupta and David (1994, 
p. 492) call the “classic contribution in the sociology of science”, particularly those works 
influenced  by  Merton  (1973),  which  do  not  address  the  epistemological  dimensions  of 
knowledge production. The notion of priority follows from the notion of parallel discovery. 
Parallel  discovery  in  turn  assumes  that  different  laboratories  can  produce  the  exact  same 
knowledge, which is the same as assuming that a replication of an experiment can be shown 
to be perfect. 
 
A different way to approach the subject from an economic angle is to ask to question under 
what conditions scientists have an incentive at all to engage in replications of experiments. 
Most attempts to replicate an experiment involve a costly investment. The returns to such an 
investment depend on the status of the knowledge claim that resulted from the experiment in 
question.  When  a knowledge claim  is  considered to be credible and useful  for scientists’ 
further research there is little interest in devoting resources to replication attempts. In case 
such an attempt fails the replicate the earlier reported findings, fellow scientists will generally 
believe  that  the  replication  experiment  has  been  carried  out  incorrectly.  And  in  case  the 
replication experiment succeeds to replicate the earlier reported findings, it will be regarded 
as replicating ‘the obvious’. In both cases, the results of the replication experiment may well 
be  deemed  unworthy  of  publication  in  scientific  journals.  Given  that  investments  in 
replications of credible knowledge claims  have  low returns, whatever the outcome of the 
replication experiments, few scientists engage in such type of research (Collins 1985).   23 
 
By contrast, if a knowledge claim is considered controversial, meaning that acceptance would 
contradict many previous claims on which scientists have build their research in the past, 
scientists will have an economic incentive to engage in replication (Collins 1985, p. 19). In 
such contexts, replication exercises have the explicit goal to replicate an experiment as to 
confirm or disconfirm a claim. Given the problem of experimental regress, there cannot be a 
fully agreed methodology that distinguishes between correct and incorrect experiments. Given 
that  controversies  often  arise  with  the  advent  of  new  instrumentalities  rather  than  from 
theoretical  advances  (de  Solla  Price  1984)  there  typically  exist  both  technological  and 
methodological uncertainties regarding the assessment of experimental evidence. That is why 
the outcome of controversies is contingent, at least to some degree, upon the entrepreneurial 
ability of each participant to find resources required to improve experiments technologically 
and methodologically, as well as upon the rhetoric ability to convince fellow scientists of the 
methodological soundness of their own experiment (Collins 1985). If through time no agreed 
methodology emerges, the different positions can lead a research community to fragment into 
two sub-communities characterised by their own methodology. Alternatively, one particular 
position,  or  a  synthesis  between  different  positions,  may  emerge  as  a  consensus  and  the 
community remains intact. 
 
A controversial claim changes the normal practice from the replication of knowledge claims 
along  well-defined  research  trajectories  to  efforts  of  actual  replication  in  a  controversial 
setting of contested knowledge.  We defined a  controversial knowledge claim  before as a 
knowledge claim that threatens the scientific  status of  many previous claims; controversy 
arises  not  so  much  because  of  the  results  of  a  new  experiment  per  se,  but  because  the 
acceptance  of  the  claim  would  require  established  knowledge  claims  to  be  revisited.   24 
Depending  on  the  number  and  importance  of  the  claims  that  would  need  revisiting  if  a 
contested  knowledge  claim  is  accepted,  controversies  will  tend  to  involve  more  or  less 
participants. Some contested claims, if accepted, require only few or unimportant claims to be 
revisited. Controversies stemming from such claims can be lively, but will tend to concern 
few  people.  Other  claims  would  require  a  major  revision  of  an  entire  field  and  will 
consequently involve many more scientists.
xv 
 
For  the  purpose  of  our  proximity  framework,  the  distinction  between  controversial  and 
uncontroversial  knowledge  claims  has  important  consequences.  Whereas  the  collaborative 
behaviour regarding the sharing of resources can  be explained  from cognitive, social and 
physical proximity in the case of uncontroversial knowledge claims, this explanatory scheme 
no longer works for controversial knowledge claims. Characteristic of controversy is there is 
no  agreement  on  the  conditions  under  which  replication  attempts  can  be  considered  true 
replication  due  to  the  problem  of  experimenter’s  regress.  Even  more  so  than  in 
uncontroversial  contexts,  the  willingness  to  share  tacit  knowledge  and  other  resources  is 
crucial to arrive at a common understanding of divergent results in replication attempts. Yet, 
the proximity framework that can be used to understand the replication of knowledge claims 
in  successive  research  projects  of  different  kinds  does  not  apply  in  the  context  of  the 
replication  of  actual  experiments.  Rather,  the  proximity  between  scientists  becomes 
endogenous  to  the  process  that  unfolds  during  the  controversy.  The  radical  uncertainty 
regarding  the  outcome  of  a  controversy,  which  generally  last  several  years,  forces  each 
scientist to ‘take sides’. To participate in the controversy, a scientist has to allocate its time 
and resources among the established and emerging research programmes. 
   25 
Following the spatial analogy implicit in the proximity concept, such repositioning can be 
termed mobility. One can thus distinguish between cognitive mobility (e.g., moving from the 
established research trajectory to a competing research trajectory), social mobility (leaving the 
established community to join a  new  sub-community) and  mobility  in the  literal physical 
sense (moving between physical sites). The latter form of mobility is crucial here, because the 
cognitive and social mobility require face-to-face interaction between likeminded scientists. 
Co-location enables the creation of strong social networks and joint cognitive investments 
including  manuals,  textbooks,  software,  equipment  and,  of  course,  laboratories.  Ideally, 
mobility here involves permanent re-location of those who wish to join an emerging research 
trajectory as to be able to work together on site on a permanent basis. However, other forms 
of mobility are possible to established temporary physical proximity (Torre and Rallet 2005; 
Torre 2008) such as workshops, summer schools, site visits, et cetera. 
 
The mobility of scientists along cognitive, social and physical dimensions in turn affect the 
knowledge  dynamics.  The  more  people  join  a  particular  research  trajectory,  the  more 
resources  become  available  to  produce,  and  more  likely  that  knowledge  claims  will  be 
replicate in subsequent research projects.
xvi The reason why critical mass matters is because 
experiments that are intended to confirm a claim are typically carried out differently than 
experiments intended to disprove a claim; experiments done by proponents will more often 
find  confirming  evidence  and  experiments  done  by  opponents  will  more  often  find  the 
opposite (Collins 1985). This is not to say that empirical evidence ‘in itself’ does not play a 
role. On the contrary, the accumulation of empirical evidence is generally decisive in settling 
controversies. Yet, this process cannot be understood as a process of inductive reasoning as 
scientists have no firm epistemological foundation to agree on what counts as a replication, 
which would be necessary to aggregate such evidence.   26 
 
The epistemological uncertainties that tend to arise when knowledge claims become contested 
limits the scope for the traditional sociological of science, economics of science included. 
Understanding  the  behaviour  of  scientists  from  private  incentives  from  which  strategic 
behaviour  follows  is  expected  to  have  much  more  explanatory  power  in  uncontroversial 
contexts than in controversial contexts. Here, the methodological rules of the game are stable 
and scientists can act strategically accordingly in their quest for maximum returns. However, 
in contexts of contested knowledge claims, the problem of replication reveals the stability of 
the rules of the game ‘break down’ as the methodological procedures and technical workings 
of apparatus itself is put into question. In such contexts, the expected returns of investments in 
certain research projects can no longer be properly assessed ex ante, since any investment in 
particular theory or methodology, and the experiments based on these, may turn out to be 
useless if controversies leads to another theory or methodology to become dominant. At that 
point, the tacit and codified knowledge that a scientist has acquired looses most of its value, 
since the results of research projects making use of these knowledge bases will no longer be 
accepted. 
 
To  understand  contexts  of  contested  knowledge,  sociology  of  scientific  knowledge  thus 
provides an alternative framework that is fully complementary to that of sociology of science. 
The synthesis of sociology of science and sociology of scientific knowledge is evident when 
the  former  accepts  that  its  theories  do  not  extend  to  controversial  contexts  of  scientific 
knowledge  production  and  the  latter  accepts  that  epistemological  concerns  can  be 
pragmatically ignored in uncontroversial contexts of scientific knowledge production. 
 
   27 
VI. Concluding remarks 
 
The geography of scientific knowledge production is understood as a process through which 
locally  produced  claims  become  accepted  as  scientific  elsewhere.  Even  if  scientists  can 
replicate each other’s knowledge claims without any tacit knowledge transfer through face-to-
face interaction, such interactions remain important in the replication of knowledge claims. 
By sharing tacit knowledge through face-to-face interaction scientists are better able to judge 
the credibility and usefulness of a knowledge claim and, hereby, to build upon each other’s 
findings in a cumulative manner. By implication, the mobility patterns of scientists affect the 
replication of knowledge claims. 
 
The focus on the replication of knowledge claims can be said to be inherent to a geography 
perspective, and to be fundamental to any geography of scientific knowledge approach. If 
knowledge claims would replicate through independent confirmations – as assumed in the 
sociology/economics of science – a new knowledge claim would either become universally 
accepted if independent experiments confirm the initial experiment, or universally rejected 
otherwise. In such a world, a geography of scientific knowledge would be redundant (even if a 
‘geography of science’ perspective could still ask the question why certain claims originate 
from certain places). If, however, the replication of scientific knowledge claims is dependent 
on  physical proximity between scientists, the diffusion of scientific knowledge claims will 
generally be only partial, and will be contingent upon the patterns of mobility of scientists. 
Mobility  is  required  to transfer  the  tacit  knowledge  that  is  complementary  to  knowledge 
claims in their use in future research. This means that to understand the dynamics of scientific 
knowledge production the analysis of scientist mobility should be much more central in our 
research. Likewise, in policy debates mobility should be put more central (Mahroum 2000). It   28 
follows  from  our  framework  that  mobility  of  scientists  may  well  be  key  to  enhancing 
scientific dynamism as the physical co-location of likeminded scientists is supportive of the 
establishment new research trajectories. 
 
In the framework proposed, the question why certain knowledge claims that originate from a 
certain  place  become  accepted  as  scientific  elsewhere  is  the  prime  question,  while  the 
question why certain knowledge claims originate from certain places is only of secondary 
importance. In controversial contexts, the geographical outcomes of replication processes are 
hard to predict as the proximity between scientists in such contexts is likely to be endogenous 
to the process of replication. One can easily predict that likeminded mobile scientists will co-
locate  as  to  enable  the  creation  of  the  cognitive  and  social  proximity  that  is  required  to 
transfer  the  new  tacit  knowledge.  Yet,  the  precise  location  where  they  co-locate  is  less 
relevant  for  tacit  knowledge  transfer.  This  means  that  the  location  of  new  research 
programmes, and the geography of scientific knowledge claims more broadly, is subject to 
path-dependent dynamics in which ‘small events’ may lead research programmes to prosper 
in some locations and to become marginalized in other locations (Arthur 1994). 
 
This  fundamental  contingency  in  the  geography  of  scientific  knowledge  claims  does  not 
imply that any place is equally likely to develop successful research programmes. One can 
think of a host of factors that support the creation of new research programmes in certain 
places including tradition,  reputation, related infrastructure and funding. Yet, as ‘carriers of 
knowledge  claims’,  only  mobile  scientists  are  capable  of  promoting  the  replication  of 
knowledge claims elsewhere as to have them replicated in subsequent knowledge claims. The 
fundamental driver of new research programmes emerging in certain places is may thus not be 
found in the particular characteristics of such prospering places, but rather in the complex   29 
network of mobility patterns of key scientists. In turn, mobility decisions may be affected by 
place characteristics, but will primarily be based on finding likeminded colleagues. Either 
way, science policy can evidently exert a great influence on mobility patterns even if the exact 
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i Some use the term laboratory in a broader sense including, for example, field sites (Gieryn 2006). Though 
much of the argumentation that follows may remain relevant using an enlarged definition, we do not explicitly 
elaborate our arguments in terms of this broader sense. Furthermore, we do not mean to cover social sciences 
and humanities. Though some of the arguments hold equally well for these sciences, there are some fundamental 
differences, in particular, the possibility that knowledge claims about humans influence their self-understanding 
and behaviour. On this, see Shapin (1995, pp. 257-258). 
ii I will not go into the question in what specific ways scientific knowledge production can be considered as an 
evolutionary process (Campbell 1974; Hull 1988). 
iii In the Dutch language, there is the appropriate verb ‘doodzwijgen’, which is literally translated as ‘to silence to 
death’. 
iv The two main replication criteria are also visible in the almost standard set up of scientific papers. Relevance is 
dealt with backward in the review section showing how it builds on previous research (replicating the knowledge 
claims that are deemed relevant) and forward in the conclusion section showing how the new claim can be made 
relevant for future research. Credibility is mainly dealt with in the methodology section where the procedures are 
specified that should be followed in an attempt to replicate the know-how itself, even if most experiments are 
never replicated. Also note that credibility and usefulness are to some extent interdepende n t .   O n e   c a n   d r a w   a  
range of conclusions from experimental results ranging from an almost literal description of technical findings to 
a full-blown argumentation that the findings prove or disprove important theories. The first way of reporting will 
be  most credible, but less relevant for future research, while the second way of reporting will be judged very 
relevant, but will raise doubts about the credibility of the claim (Pinch 1985). It is often during the review 
process that the “right” level of credibility and usefulness is negotiated with the claimant having to give in by 
qualifying its claims as being credible only under particular assumptions or particular contexts, and, therefore, 
being relevant only to a small domain of scientific inquiry. Put differently, the review process decides the level 
in the hierarchy of claims at which the article should position itself (Meyers 1985). Of course, the findings may 
still be judged as being more or less relevant and more or less credible than the author has stated in the published 
version. In the remainder, we will not go into the review process explicitly. 
v Consistent with the theoretical framework proposed before, one can follow the replication of a knowledge 
claim through the citations it receives. We do mean to imply that all citations are replications of knowledge 
claims, but that the replication of knowledge claims can be studied by tracing the citations to a knowledge claim. 
A citation can involve a replication of a knowledge claim in the sense that a citation invokes a claim in a 
particular  argumentative  context  within  the  citing  paper.  The  use  of  citations  in  scientific  papers  makes  it 
possible  to  condense  the  description  of  the  experiments, its  findings  and  its interpretation  by  citing  papers 
containing the knowledge claims that are implied by the experiment. The evolutionary nature of the replication 
of knowledge claims can now be reformulated in terms of citations. Each new knowledge claim re-combines 
earlier  knowledge  claims  by  citing  a  sub-set  of  papers  each  containing  particular  knowledge  claims.  The 
meaning attributed to citations here, however, does not imply that citations necessarily reflect ‘intellectual debt’. 
Not all knowledge claims implied by the experiment are cited and that not all citations refer to knowledge claims 
that are implied by the experiment (Gilbert 1977; Amsterdamska and Leydesdorff 1989; Hicks and Potter 1991; 
Wouters 1999). 
vi The proximity concept used here follows the Rallet-Torre-Boschma notion of proximity. On different notions 
of proximity and its history in the economic geography profession, see Carrincazeaux et al. (2008). 
vi i  Indeed,  anonymous  peer  review  is  based  on  such  judgements  without  any  interaction  between 
claimant and evaluator (even if the editor generally, but not necessarily, acts as a mediator interacting with 
both parties). 
viii  For  an  illustrative  example,  see  e.g.  the  study  by  Hull  (1988)  on  observational  evidence  supporting 
chromosome theory in the early twentieth century, in particular Hull (1988, pp. 56-57). 
ix Essentially, this is also what is being done when training undergraduate students in replicating experiments 
(Collins 1985). 
x A related question is under hat conditions scientists want to share material objects relevant for research. There 
is evidence that scientists are reluctant to share materials if competition is fierce and the cost of sharing is high 
(Walsh et al. 2007). Exchange of materials differs, however, from the sharing of tacit knowledge since the 
former does not require face-to-face interaction per se. 
xi For an illustrative example, see e.g. the study by Biagiolo (2000) on Galileo. 
xii For an illustrative example, see e.g. the study by Atkinson et al. (1998) on myotonic dystrophy. 
xiii Note that social proximity coincides with the indicator of tie strength proposed by Granovetter as the degree 
of overlap of two individuals’ friendship networks (Granovetter 1973, p. 1362).   35 
                                                                                                                                                   
xiv  Alternatively,  if  one  prefers  a  more  precise  definition,  one  can  think  of  geographical  proximity  as  the 
generalised travel costs between the two places of residences, where generalised travel costs stand for the cost of 
transportation and lodging plus the opportunity costs of travel time. 
xv To be more precise, the exact implications of the acceptance of a contested knowledge claim is not a given. 
Opponents of a knowledge claim can alternate between two rhetoric positions vis-à-vis the new knowledge claim 
(Collins 1985, pp. 134-135). They can exaggerate the implications of the experiment by arguing that those who 
accept the claim, should therefore abandon a very large part of received knowledge claims. Or, opponents can 
play down the implications of the new knowledge claim by arguing that, even if one would accept the claim, its 
implications for the larger part of knowledge  claims are negligible. This implies that whether scientists put 
forward their new knowledge claim as having major or minor implications for previous knowledge  claims, 
opponents will always have the opposite angle available to attack it. The controversial nature of a knowledge 
claim is itself contingent. 
x vi Also known as increasing returns to adoption (Arthur 1994). 